Debian Patches

Status for cifs-utils/2:7.4-1+deb13u1

Patch Description Author Forwarded Bugs Origin Last update
0001-Fix-fPIE-casing.patch Fix -fPIE casing
-fpie seems to work, but bhlc complains that -fPIE is missing		 Mathieu Parent <math.parent@gmail.com> yes upstream 2019-07-31
spelling.patch spelling fixes: priviledges conjuction informations openning permissons
diff --git a/cifscreds.c b/cifscreds.c		 Michael Tokarev <mjt@tls.msk.ru> no 2025-03-15
cifs.upcall-remove-getpwuid-dependency.patch cifs.upcall: remove getpwuid() dependency
This patch removes getpwuid() and resort to getting UID/GID from
/proc/pid/status

Changes:
- add get_uidgid() helper
- drop supplementary groups (i.e. move setgroups(0, NULL)) before even
decoding spnego key -- those are never needed in any case		 Enzo Matsumiya <ematsumiya@suse.de> no debian https://git.samba.org/?p=cifs-utils.git;a=commit;h=972c5b5ff95e3e812bc8daa72d0383654ab0dba7 2026-06-15
mount.cifs-reject-option-delimiters-in-username-and-.patch [PATCH 1/2] mount.cifs: reject option delimiters in username and domain

The username= and domain= values from a credentials file, and the USER
environment variable, are copied verbatim into the kernel mount option
string as user=<value>/domain=<value>. The kernel option parser is
comma separated and last-write-wins, so a value like

username=smbuser,uid=0,forceuid,noperm

injects further options past mount.cifs's uid=/gid= sanitizer, yielding
a root-owned mount with permission checks disabled. A caller that can
control the credentials file (e.g. pam_mount) thus gains local root.

Reject username and domain values containing an option delimiter (comma,
equals, CR or LF) at the two untokenized inputs. Command-line
-o user=/domain= is already split on commas, and passwords are left
alone as they may legitimately contain these characters.		 Paulo Alcantara <pc@manguebit.org> no 2026-09-17
mount.cifs-validate-username-derived-from-the-passwd.patch [PATCH 2/2] mount.cifs: validate username derived from the passwd database

When neither the credentials file nor the USER environment variable
supplies a username, assemble_mountinfo() falls back to the caller's
passwd login name via getusername(getuid()) and copies it verbatim into
the "user=" mount option, just like the other two sources. Run it
through check_creds_field() as well so the invariant "the username never
contains an option delimiter" holds regardless of where the username
came from. Unlike the credentials file and USER env, this value is not
attacker-controlled, so this is defense in depth rather than a fix for
the injection itself.

While here, guard against getusername() returning NULL (no passwd entry
for the uid), which was previously passed straight into strlcpy().		 Paulo Alcantara <pc@manguebit.org> no 2026-09-17

All known versions for source package 'cifs-utils'

Links