Debian Patches

Status for corosync/3.1.7-1+deb12u2

Patch Description Author Forwarded Bugs Origin Last update
Fix-various-typos-in-ChangeLog.patch Fix various typos in ChangeLog
This file isn't present in the upstream VCS, but generated from the Git
commit messages during the release process. Thus fixing typos in it
isn't upstreamable.
Ferenc Wágner <wferi@niif.hu> no 2016-08-29
Enable-PrivateTmp-in-the-systemd-service-files.patch Enable PrivateTmp in the systemd service files Ferenc Wágner <wferi@debian.org> no 2018-12-10
Make-the-example-config-valid.patch Make the example config valid Ferenc Wágner <wferi@debian.org> no 2018-12-16
Revert-logrotate-Use-copytruncate-method-by-default.patch Revert "logrotate: Use copytruncate method by default"
This reverts commit 04362046c4a9d7307feb5b68341d567b7d0b94d6.

The copytruncate documentation says that it should not be used to avoid
losing logging data. The drawbacks mentioned in the reverted commit are
not relevant, because they involve hiding problems which should be fixed
at their respective origins instead.
Ferenc Wágner <ferenc.wagner@balabit.com> no 2023-01-15
CVE-2025-30472.patch totemsrp: Check size of orf_token msg
orf_token message is stored into preallocated array on endian convert
so carefully crafted malicious message can lead to crash of corosync.

Solution is to check message size beforehand.
Jan Friesse <jfriesse@redhat.com> no 2025-03-24
totemsrp-Return-error-if-sanity-check-fails.patch totemsrp: Return error if sanity check fails
Previously, the check_memb_commit_token_sanity function correctly
checked the minimum message length. However, if the message was too
short, it incorrectly returned a success code (0) instead of the
expected failure code (-1).

This commit ensures the appropriate error code is returned when the
message length sanity check fails.
Jan Friesse <jfriesse@redhat.com> no 2026-04-02
totemsrp-Fix-integer-overflow-in-memb_join_sanity.patch totemsrp: Fix integer overflow in memb_join_sanity
This commit addresses an integer overflow (wraparound) vulnerability
in the check_memb_join_sanity function.

Previously, the 32-bit unsigned network values proc_list_entries and
failed_list_entries were added together before being promoted to
size_t. This allowed the addition to wrap around in 32-bit arithmetic
(e.g., 0x80000000 + 0x80000000 = 0), resulting in a required_len
calculation that was incorrectly small.

The solution is to cast the list entries to size_t and verify that
neither exceeds the maximum allowed value before the addition occurs.
Jan Friesse <jfriesse@redhat.com> no 2026-04-02

All known versions for source package 'corosync'

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