Debian Patches
Status for haveged/1.9.19-12+deb13u1
| Patch | Description | Author | Forwarded | Bugs | Origin | Last update |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| debian/0001-shm-directory.patch | Creating /dev/shm if its not existing (Closes: #1087324). diff -Naurp haveged.orig/src/haveged.c haveged/src/haveged.c |
Daniel Baumann <daniel@debian.org> | no | |||
| debian/0002-flush-startup-output.patch | flush output after printing the startup message, to avoid confusion of the service "starting up" after receiving sigterm. diff -Naurp haveged.orig/src/haveged.c haveged/src/haveged.c |
Dimitri John Ledkov <xnox@ubuntu.com> | no | |||
| Fix-privilege-escalation-via-command-socket-CVE-2026.patch | Fix privilege escalation via command socket (CVE-2026-41054) The uid != 0 check sent a NAK to non-root callers but did not exit the function, allowing execution to fall through to the command switch. This allowed unprivileged local users to send commands (MAGIC_CHROOT, MAGIC_CLOSE) to the root-running daemon via the abstract UNIX socket. Add goto out after the NAK response to properly reject non-root connections. |
Jirka Hladky <hladky.jiri@gmail.com> | no | debian | https://github.com/jirka-h/haveged/commit/3870de0270d3fa2067490ffa47491abde4ad69c6 | 2026-05-05 |
| Check-peer-credentials-before-reading-command-CVE-20.patch | Check peer credentials before reading command (CVE-2026-41054) Move the SO_PEERCRED uid check before the magic-byte read so unauthenticated callers are rejected without any command parsing. Also zero-initialize the magic buffer. |
Jirka Hladky <hladky.jiri@gmail.com> | no | https://github.com/jirka-h/haveged/commit/bcd7e52bcf0068225b7ee84a1f85c9d72a787b54 | 2026-05-08 |
All known versions for source package 'haveged'
- 1.9.21-1 (sid, forky)
- 1.9.19-12+deb13u1 (trixie-security, trixie-proposed-updates)
- 1.9.19-12 (trixie)
- 1.9.14-1+deb12u1 (bookworm-proposed-updates, bookworm-security)
- 1.9.14-1 (bookworm)