Debian Patches
Status for heat/1:27.0.0-6
| Patch | Description | Author | Forwarded | Bugs | Origin | Last update |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| remove-broken-rst.patch | Remove broken RST In hot_spec.rst, there's some lines that are FTBFS with the newer docutils. Since it doesn't seem that important, and it's best to keep the rest of the documentation, we're just removing the block. =================================================================== |
Thomas Goirand <zigo@debian.org> | no | debian | 2017-01-08 | |
| package-all-files.patch | Package all files | Thomas Goirand <zigo@debian.org> | no | 2017-12-15 | ||
| add-heat_api_root-configuration-variable.patch | Add heat_api_root configuration variable =================================================================== |
Thomas Goirand <zigo@debian.org> | yes | 2021-10-07 | ||
| sb-2011933_Enforce_stack-user_binding_on_resource_signal.patch | Enforce stack-user binding on resource_signal EngineService.resource_signal() executes signals under the stack's stored owner context (use_stored_context=True) but never verified that the requesting stack user is bound to the resource being signalled. describe_stack_resource() enforces that binding through _authorize_stack_user(), and the metadata read path is bound the same way. Stack users are per-stack domain users, so a leaked stack-user credential only exposes the resources of its own stack, but any resource within that stack could be signalled, forging deployment output values that heat consumes in owner-driven stack updates. . This version of the patch additionally registers the access handlers when the stack is loaded, as BaseServer and AWS::IAM::AccessKey already do: SignalResponder resources (WaitConditionHandle, SoftwareDeployment, AutoScalingPolicy) never reached the handler registry, because it is only populated in the process that created the resource and StackUser._register_access_key() relied on an access_key property that only server classes define. Without this, the binding check denied every legitimate in-instance signal, on both the CFN ec2 path and the HEAT_SIGNAL deployment path. The registration is skipped in convergence checks, where resource ids can be unresolved placeholders. . Signals authenticated with ec2 credentials (the CFN API path) keep working through the _authorize_stack_user() fallback, and signals from contexts without the stack-user role are unaffected. diff --git a/heat/engine/resources/server_base.py b/heat/engine/resources/server_base.py index 50a04e0a2..b0bd137a5 100644 |
Thomas Goirand <zigo@debian.org> | yes | debian | upstream, https://review.opendev.org/c/openstack/heat/+/1016002 | 2026-11-17 |
All known versions for source package 'heat'
- 1:27.0.0-6 (forky, sid)
- 1:24.0.0-2 (trixie)
- 1:19.0.0-3 (bookworm)
