Debian Patches

Status for heat/1:27.0.0-6

Patch Description Author Forwarded Bugs Origin Last update
remove-broken-rst.patch Remove broken RST In hot_spec.rst, there's some lines that are FTBFS with the newer docutils.
Since it doesn't seem that important, and it's best to keep the rest of the
documentation, we're just removing the block.

===================================================================
Thomas Goirand <zigo@debian.org> no debian 2017-01-08
package-all-files.patch Package all files Thomas Goirand <zigo@debian.org> no 2017-12-15
add-heat_api_root-configuration-variable.patch Add heat_api_root configuration variable
===================================================================
Thomas Goirand <zigo@debian.org> yes 2021-10-07
sb-2011933_Enforce_stack-user_binding_on_resource_signal.patch Enforce stack-user binding on resource_signal EngineService.resource_signal() executes signals under the stack's
stored owner context (use_stored_context=True) but never verified
that the requesting stack user is bound to the resource being
signalled. describe_stack_resource() enforces that binding through
_authorize_stack_user(), and the metadata read path is bound the
same way. Stack users are per-stack domain users, so a leaked
stack-user credential only exposes the resources of its own stack,
but any resource within that stack could be signalled, forging
deployment output values that heat consumes in owner-driven stack
updates.
.
This version of the patch additionally registers the access handlers
when the stack is loaded, as BaseServer and AWS::IAM::AccessKey
already do: SignalResponder resources (WaitConditionHandle,
SoftwareDeployment, AutoScalingPolicy) never reached the handler
registry, because it is only populated in the process that created
the resource and StackUser._register_access_key() relied on an
access_key property that only server classes define. Without this,
the binding check denied every legitimate in-instance signal, on
both the CFN ec2 path and the HEAT_SIGNAL deployment path. The
registration is skipped in convergence checks, where resource ids
can be unresolved placeholders.
.
Signals authenticated with ec2 credentials (the CFN API path) keep
working through the _authorize_stack_user() fallback, and signals
from contexts without the stack-user role are unaffected.

diff --git a/heat/engine/resources/server_base.py b/heat/engine/resources/server_base.py
index 50a04e0a2..b0bd137a5 100644
Thomas Goirand <zigo@debian.org> yes debian upstream, https://review.opendev.org/c/openstack/heat/+/1016002 2026-11-17

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