Debian Patches

Status for ironic-python-agent/11.5.0-4

Patch Description Author Forwarded Bugs Origin Last update
fix-syntax-warning.patch Fix syntax warning
===================================================================
Thomas Goirand <zigo@debian.org> no debian 2025-01-02
CVE-2026-43003_Add_a_flag_to_disable_installing_bootloaders.patch CVE-2026-43003: Add a flag to disable installing bootloaders Disables bootloader installations (calls to grub-install)
for security reasons as part of the mitigation for CVE-2026-43003.

diff --git a/ironic_python_agent/agent.py b/ironic_python_agent/agent.py
index 4d8406c..66bc29c 100644
Clif Houck <me@clifhouck.com> yes upstream upstream, https://review.opendev.org/c/openstack/ironic-python-agent/+/993016 2026-06-17
CVE-2026-66138_OSSA-2026-027_fix_NTP_command_handling.patch Adds basic validation of the NTP server parameter to harden the
usage of the NTP server time setting *AND* also uses shlex.quote
to and removes shell=true from the execution invocation to prevent
any possibliity of injecting a malicious command to be executed.

diff --git a/ironic_python_agent/tests/unit/extensions/test_standby.py b/ironic_python_agent/tests/unit/extensions/test_standby.py
index 29acdac..acac1ec 100644
Julia Kreger <juliaashleykreger@gmail.com> yes debian upstream upstream, https://review.opendev.org/c/openstack/ironic-python-agent/+/998488 2026-07-28
CVE-2026-54422-OSSA-2026-028_Do_not_expose_registry_pull_secret_to_bootc_container.patch Do not expose registry pull secret to bootc container During bootc deployment, the registry pull secret (authfile) was
written to a well-known path on the host and passed to
'podman run --privileged --pid=host --authfile=...'. Because the
container runs with host PID namespace visibility, tenant-controlled
code in the bootc image could read the credential via
/proc/1/root/<authfile-path>.
.
When the pull secret originates from an operator/admin source
(driver_info.image_pull_secret, [deploy] image_server_user/password,
or [oci] authentication_config) rather than the tenant's own
instance_info.image_pull_secret, this constitutes a cross-boundary
credential disclosure: a project-scoped node owner member recovers
the operator's registry credential, which may be shared across
nodes, projects, or the entire conductor.
.
Fix by splitting the authenticated image pull from the container
execution:
.
1. Write the auth file to a random temporary path (not the
well-known ~/.config/containers/auth.json).
2. Run 'podman pull --authfile=<tmpfile>' to fetch and cache the
image in the local store.
3. Delete the auth file in a finally block, guaranteeing cleanup
even on pull failure.
4. Run 'podman run' without --authfile. The image is already
cached locally and --skip-fetch-check is already in use, so
no registry credential is needed at runtime.
.
By the time tenant container code executes, the credential file
no longer exists on the host filesystem and cannot be read via
/proc/1/root.

diff --git a/ironic_python_agent/extensions/standby.py b/ironic_python_agent/extensions/standby.py
index 31d705d..72acb48 100644
Steve Baker <sbaker@redhat.com> yes debian upstream upstream, https://review.opendev.org/c/openstack/ironic-python-agent/+/998481 2026-07-28

All known versions for source package 'ironic-python-agent'

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