Debian Patches
Status for qt6-5compat/6.11.2-4
| Patch | Description | Author | Forwarded | Bugs | Origin | Last update |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| upstream_d0cd01d_CVE-2026-101201.diff | QBinaryJson: prevent OOB read in fromBinaryData() The fromBinaryData() function computes the document bound in size_t, but then truncates it to uint. As a result, when provided a malformed binary json with root.size in the range of [0xFFFFFFF8, 0xFFFFFFFF], the total size overflows to the values between 0 and 7, and the size check incorrectly passes. When combined with a malicious tableOffset, this results in an out-of-bounds read in the range of up to 4 GiB past the end of the allocated buffer - depending on the memory layout it can lead to either a crash or a read of some potentially sensitive data. Do the calculations in uint and use qAddOverflow() to detect overflows. Since the underlying data structure uses uint to store the size of the allocated data, we can simply return early if we detect an overflow. The newly-added test creates a larger buffer and copies a correct binary json blob there. Then it injects the malformed size of the payload and a new offset of the data table, together with the new table. Then the test uses this large buffer to demonstrate an out-of-bounds read on a modified blob. If the data was not backed by a large buffer, it would have been an out-of-bounds read. The fromRawData() method is not affected (assuming that the passed size is correct), because it uses the input size parameter directly, without analyzing the internal structure of the binary json blob. (cherry picked from commit c0a495894d83a3c48055bd1e544f93147fc6ade1) (cherry picked from commit 173cc93ec160719dfb0268971ba16e4e8f46dc57) |
Ivan Solovev <ivan.solovev@qt.io> | no | 2026-08-10 | ||
| upstream_6a61c85_CVE-2026-101201.diff | QBinaryJson::fromBinaryData(): do the comparison in size_t In Qt 6, the QBA can actually store more than UINT_MAX bytes, so casting to uint can truncate. Use size_t instead. Amends the port of Qt container size_type form int to qsizetype (Qt 6.0). (cherry picked from commit 721ed576391211ca53ecdaaecf6dd41df7bc962e) (cherry picked from commit 897a3421f925cb73409d3138d464b8c0ab30d15d) |
Ivan Solovev <ivan.solovev@qt.io> | no | 2026-08-11 | ||
| upstream_CVE-2026-107472.diff | QTextCodec: fix OOB read in TSCII codec The TSCII codec iterates over the input buffer, and if the currently processed QChar is not ASCII (has a value larger than 0x80), tries to analyze the next two QChars. The problem is that it does so without validating the i + 1 and i + 2 indices against the input length. As a result, if it can try to read up to two QChars past the end of the input buffer. The test is crafted in such way, that a larger buffer is passed as an input, so it does not trigger ASAN in case of failure, but rather simply reports an invalid result. Note that the else branch in the code that now records an error could instead save the trailing QChar in the converter state, so that the following chunk could decode it properly. But this patch does not try to fix the correctness of the encoding, it simply eliminates the read past the end of the input buffer. (cherry picked from commit 5841a625142199bf3c58e6ace6fa2c4a8a2c5254) (cherry picked from commit 9b5b9a57e72c9d69197b99ab4a3939833d334377) |
Ivan Solovev <ivan.solovev@qt.io> | no | 2026-08-21 | ||
| upstream_CVE-2026-107479.diff | QTextCodec: fix silent truncation of input data to int The QTextCodec APIs did not account for the fact that QStringView, QString, and QByteArray uses qsizetype, not int, to represent its size. As a result, the size is silently truncated when passing to the underlying API, which can produce negative values for inputs larger than INT_MAX. This can lead to all sorts of surprising results, depending on the codec implementation. Fix by explicitly checking the input size against INT_MAX. Raise a warning and return early if the size is greater than this value. The toUnicode(const char *) overload is special. It is using qstrlen() to calculate the input size. The qstrlen() method returns size_t (or uint in 5.15), which is then truncated to int, and we get the same problem. Since qstrlen() in 5.15 is broken (returning uint instead of size_t), fix by using strlen() directly and comparing the result against INT_MAX. Raise a warning and return early if the size is greater than this value. We could theoretically rewrite the code to do the conversion in a loop, but since it is a compatibility code, the valid usecases are supposed to use is with inputs less than INT_MAX anyway. If it is required to deal with a larger input, the chunking can be implemented at the user side. [ChangeLog][QTextCodec] Fixed a bug in toUnicode(), fromUnicode(), and canEncode() methods that could silently truncate the size of input data if it exceeded INT_MAX. The updated code now raises a warning and returns an empty QString/QByteArray immediately. To process long inputs, implement chunking of the input data on the client side, using the toUnicode() and fromUnicode() overloads that take the ConverterState as the last parameter. (cherry picked from commit 8631aea33f3de13c23fcd740d8900c775c18ac00) (cherry picked from commit aff163c0589bd3c089ab0fe5cfc8a8708319fdc9) |
Ivan Solovev <ivan.solovev@qt.io> | no | 2026-08-24 | ||
| upstream_CVE-2026-107590.diff | QTextCodec: fix OOB write in ICONV codec The ICONV codec has a size miscalculation error when encoding continues with a high surrogate kept in the state after encoding of the previous chunk. The code was requesting a resize based on the length in UTF-16 code points instead of the length in bytes. As a result, we were requesting half of the bytes that we actually needed. Note that since resize() allocates more than requested, the code could sometimes execute successfully. The test specifically adds a large tail to the input, so that memcpy() clearly triggers an out-of-bounds write. The test was triggering ASAN before the fix. (cherry picked from commit cf3f5fbc8bae37cd358b8157cff11b329cca02aa) (cherry picked from commit 724025a7c05596961cc870ef703a2f2b14e55c88) |
Ivan Solovev <ivan.solovev@qt.io> | no | 2026-08-21 |
