Debian Patches
Status for udisks2/2.10.1-12.1+deb13u2
| Patch | Description | Author | Forwarded | Bugs | Origin | Last update |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| tests-Fix-targetcli_config.json.patch | tests: Fix targetcli_config.json Not all attributes are available anymore in newer kernel versions. (cherry picked from commit acae6bf4594f80da57855343ab325f87386178c4) |
Tomas Bzatek <tbzatek@redhat.com> | no | 2023-11-03 | ||
| integration-test-Adapt-to-the-new-libmount-context-error-.patch | integration-test: Adapt to the new libmount context error messages | Tomas Bzatek <tbzatek@redhat.com> | no | 2024-04-30 | ||
| Do-not-overwrite-CPPFLAGS.patch | Do not overwrite CPPFLAGS Use AM_CPPFLAGS instead of ovewriting CPPFLAGS. CPPFLAGS is a user variable reserved for local modifications. See https://www.gnu.org/software/automake/manual/html_node/Flag-Variables-Ordering.html https://github.com/storaged-project/udisks/pull/1296 |
Michael Biebl <biebl@debian.org> | no | 2024-07-04 | ||
| integration-test-Fix-change-label-test-with-exfatprogs-1..patch | integration-test: Fix change label test with exfatprogs 1.2.5 Like VFAT, EXFAT does not allow some characters in the label. Since version 1.2.5 exfatprogs refuses to set a label with those invalid characters. Because this changed in version 1.2.5 we cannot assert that setting such label would throw without knowing the exfatprogs version. While we're touching this part of the test, also document why we're using a shorter label compared to the other filesystems. |
Alessandro Astone <alessandro.astone@canonical.com> | yes | 2024-08-14 | ||
| tests-Fix-expected-error-message-with-util-linux-2.41.patch | tests: Fix expected error message with util-linux 2.41 (cherry picked from commit ccf772b2fe3505b181f5adf8ca3f912c003032f1) |
Vojtech Trefny <vtrefny@redhat.com> | no | 2025-02-24 | ||
| udiskslinuxfilesystemhelpers-Mount-private-mounts-wi.patch | udiskslinuxfilesystemhelpers: Mount private mounts with 'nodev,nosuid' The private mount done in take_filesystem_ownership() should always default to 'nodev,nosuid' for security and 'errors=remount-ro' for selected filesystem to handle corrupted filesystem. This is consistent with mount options calculation for regular mounts. |
Tomas Bzatek <tbzatek@redhat.com> | no | 2025-06-04 | ||
| udiskslinuxmanager-Add-lower-bounds-check-to-fd_inde.patch | [PATCH 1/1] udiskslinuxmanager: Add lower bounds check to fd_index Make sure fd_index isn't negative as this can lead to an OOB read resulting in a crash, or to exposing internal file descriptors. Reported by Michael Imfeld (born0monday). |
Marc Deslauriers <marc.deslauriers@canonical.com> | no | 2025-07-15 | ||
| cve-2026-7867-01.patch | [PATCH 1/5] udiskslinuxfilesystem: Separate real caller identity from as-user target When the 'as-user' option is specified in Filesystem.Mount(), the code previously overwrote caller_uid/caller_gid with the target user's identity. This meant downstream functions received a uid they believed was the D-Bus caller's, but was actually the target's. Introduce effective_uid/effective_gid/effective_user_name to hold the as-user target identity (or the caller's identity when as-user is not set). The real D-Bus caller identity is now always resolved into caller_uid/caller_gid and used for authorization-related decisions (setup_by_user, on_user_seat checks), while effective_* is used for mount point calculation, run_as_uid/run_as_gid, and state tracking. (cherry picked from commit 397eea88d58f77f6e02d537c4c961201b9245943) |
Tomas Bzatek <tbzatek@redhat.com> | no | 2026-04-28 | ||
| cve-2026-7867-02.patch | [PATCH 2/5] udiskslinuxfilesystem: Rework fstab mount authorization for as-user The polkit authorization logic in handle_mount_fstab() had two problems when 'as-user' was combined with fstab entries containing 'user', 'users' or 'x-udisks-auth' mount options: 1. The 'filesystem-mount-other-user' polkit check was inside the code block that is skipped when 'user'/'users'/'x-udisks-auth' options are present, allowing an unprivileged caller to mount on behalf of another user without any authorization. 2. When 'user' or 'users' fstab options were present and the initial mount attempt failed with a permission error, the code would fall back to mounting as root. This fallback should only be available when 'x-udisks-auth' is explicitly specified. Restructure the authorization flow so that: - The 'filesystem-mount-other-user' check is evaluated first, independently of fstab mount options, and is always enforced when caller_uid != effective_uid. - The root fallback on BD_FS_ERROR_AUTH is gated on 'x-udisks-auth' being present, not just any of the user-level mount options. - When root uses 'as-user' without 'user'/'users' fstab options, the root fallback is implicitly enabled. - Regular polkit checks (filesystem-mount, mount-system, mount-other-seat) only apply for same-user mounts without 'user'/'users'/'x-udisks-auth'. Update the D-Bus API documentation to reflect the new behavior. (cherry picked from commit 68108081aa9049cf3bb2fb0044cb4de83f962390) |
Tomas Bzatek <tbzatek@redhat.com> | no | 2026-04-28 | ||
| cve-2026-7867-03.patch | [PATCH 3/5] udiskslinuxfilesystem: Log real caller uid for as-user mounts When a mount is performed with the as-user option targeting a different user, log both the effective (target) uid and the real caller uid to provide an audit trail of who authorized the operation. (cherry picked from commit 98e5a76c155640d155280cdb642791f00def736a) |
Tomas Bzatek <tbzatek@redhat.com> | no | 2026-05-03 | ||
| cve-2026-7867-04.patch | [PATCH 4/5] udisksdaemonutil: Pass as-user target to polkit details When the 'as-user' D-Bus method option is present, propagate the target username to polkit details as 'mount.as-user'. This allows polkit rules to make fine-grained authorization decisions based on who the mount is being performed for. (cherry picked from commit 681d58a76f6aaa5045eb43e665c65f497d35b810) |
Tomas Bzatek <tbzatek@redhat.com> | no | 2026-04-28 | ||
| cve-2026-7867-05.patch | [PATCH 5/5] tests: Add security tests for as-user mount authorization Add tests verifying that an unprivileged D-Bus caller cannot exploit the 'as-user' option in Filesystem.Mount() to mount on behalf of another user without polkit authorization. Use a dedicated 'udisks_test_target' user instead of 'nobody' to avoid OS-level special treatment of system users that could mask real behavior. Dynamic mount tests (in UdisksFSTestCase, inherited by all FS types): - test_mount_as_user_denied: as-user=<another_user> is denied - test_mount_as_user_root_denied: as-user=root is denied - test_mount_as_user_self: as-user=<self> behaves like plain mount Fstab mount tests (in NonPOSIXTestCase, inherited by VFAT/EXFAT): - test_mount_fstab_{users,user,x-udisks-auth}_as_user_denied: fstab entries that normally allow unprivileged mounting must still require authorization when as-user is specified - test_mount_fstab_{users,user,x-udisks-auth}_as_root_denied: same but with as-user=root - test_mount_fstab_defaults_as_user_from_root: root can mount fstab 'defaults' device with as-user targeting a non-root user - test_mount_fstab_defaults_as_user_denied: unprivileged user cannot mount fstab 'defaults' device with as-user (cherry picked from commit 5ec20c9d5719ead510d800bc3eb5a731e5712f39) |
Tomas Bzatek <tbzatek@redhat.com> | no | 2026-04-29 |
All known versions for source package 'udisks2'
- 2.11.2-1 (sid)
- 2.11.1-2 (forky)
- 2.10.1-12.1+deb13u2 (trixie-security)
- 2.10.1-12.1+deb13u1 (trixie)
- 2.9.4-4+deb12u2 (bookworm-security, bookworm)
